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STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiffs seek mandatory injunotive enforcement of
a restriotive covenant. Such enforcement would compel
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defendants to remove certain structures and appurtenances to a gas station on 13th East Street and Simpson
Avenue in Salt Lake City, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court. The court entered
its findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment
denying to plaintiffs any damages but granting them
specific injunctive enforcement of the alleged covenant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
These defendants seek judgment as a matter of law
that plaintiffs are not entitled to injimctive relief. In
the alternative, defendants seek (1) a new trial or (2)
an order dismissing plamtifEs' complaint for failure to
join an indispensable party.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates
is a limited partnership. Defendants Spence Clark and
James Collier were, during the relevant periods herein,
the general partners in this enterprise. The defendant
partnership's primary asset consists of real property in
the Union Heights subdivision in the Sugarhouse area
of Salt Lake City. This property forms part of a center
of retail shops and stores known as the Sugarhouse Shopping Center. Other portions of this Center are owned
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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by the plaintiffs, Nick, Gus and John Fapanikolas, doing
business as Papanikolas Brothers.1
The Center was developed by the plaintiffs and A.
R. Curtis & Sons Company, but these two parties did
not form a partnership to hold the land. Each retained
its individual ownership interest in the various distinct
parcels of property comprising the Center. Beginning
in the 1950's, these developers entered a series of agreements reserving certain areas of the Center for parking
and for the accommodation of the Center's tenants and
their patrons. One of these agreements, dated March
1954 (Ex. 1), reserved, among other areas, a 50-foot
portion of the property owned by A. R. Curtis & Sons
Company on the east side of the Center abutting 13th
East on the north of Simpson Avenue. The agreement,
which was recorded, styled this restriction as a covenant
running with the land effective until 1999 (Ex. 1).
There were other agreements between the Papanikolas Bros., and A. R. Curtis & Sons, (See plaintiffs'
requests for admissions attached and included in the
record but unmarked as part thereof.) At trial, over the
objection of defendants' counsel (Tr. 29-31), plaintiffs
elected to rely for the enforcement of the claimed covenant only on the March 1954 agreement and offered no
1

The action was originally brought in the name of Papanikolas Brothers, a partnership. Because of defendants' objection, the individual partners were named as the party plaintiffs
at the commencement of the trial. In addition, Warren E. Swartz,
Marjorie Swartz, Robert C. Honodel, Betty Honodel, Myrne M.
Collier, and Jill Clark were dismissed at the beginning of the
trial as parties defendant.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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proof as to the effect or meaning of the subsequent agreements.2
Sugar/house Shopping Center Associates acquired the
Curtis' interest in the Center in late 1968 and 1969.3 In
October of 1969, the partnership leased the property in
the Center facing 13th East and lying north of Simpson
Avenue to American Oil Company (Ex. 2). Subsequently
these parties executed a lease rider (Ex. 3) which, among
other things, acknowledged that the construction of the
station "may be in violation" of the recorded 1954 agreement (Ex. 3).
Shortly after the execution of these documents, construction began on the leased premises (Tr. 80). Prior
to constniction, American Oil placed a sign on the property announcing that a service station would soon be
built (Tr. 92). Constaiiction, lasting somewhat longer
than normal because of land fill problems on the north
edge of the leased premises, was completed in approximately August of 1970 (Tr. 80).
On August 13, 1970, the Papanikolas' attorney wrote
2
The other agreements were not offered or received into
evidence. Also, these defendants had asserted third party claims
against an individual shareholder of A. R. Curtis & Sons for
breach of warranty arising from the failure of the selling Curtis
shareholders to disclose to defendants the existence of the unrecorded agreements. Because of plaintiffs' election to rely only
on the recorded agreement, this third party claim was dismissed
by the trial court judge. (Tr. 31).
3
The method of acquisition was as follows: The partnership acquired the shares of A. R. Curtis & Sons Company, dissolved the Company, and transferred its assets to the partnership.
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these defendants claiming that the newly erected station
violated restrictive covenants governing the premises (Ex.
5). In response, the partnership's attorney asserted (1)
that the covenant had not been violated and (2) that
the station was consistent with the use of the property
contemplated in the agreement. Papanikolas' attorney
countered by suggesting that the construction of the station violated later, more explicit agreements (Ex. 7).
After this exchange of correspondence, the parties
had no other contact apart from some desultory and
apparently inconclusive discussions about one party selling its interest to the other (Tr. 53-54, 65). On March
6, 1972, more than 18 months after the station was completed, suit was filed (R. 2).
At trial plaintiffs abandoned their damage claims
and offered no evidence showing how the alleged violation harmed them. Plaintiffs' evidence showed that part
of an overhanging canopy, portions of one pump island,
and one sign were within the 50-foot restricted area (Ex.
4; Tr. 42-44). The trial court's injunction requires the
desitruotion of all these improvements and eliminates all
access to the station from 13th East Street.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE GRANTING OF THE INJUNCTION
WAS IMPROPER.
Plaintiffs offered no proof of damages. Nonetheless,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
the trial court ruled that they were entitled to specific
enforcement of the claimed covenant in the face of compelling evidence showing very great damage and inconvenience to defendants from the injunction and in spite
of long and unexplained delays in seeking enforcement.
The central and critical issue in this appeal is, therefore,
the piropriety of the injunctive relief granted to plaintiffs.
A. The Injunction Was Improper Because the
Evidence Showed That the "Balance of Injury'9
Was Far Greater to Defendants Than Plaintiffs.
As indicated, plaintiffs offered no evidence of damage. In fact, although the purpose of the restrictive covenant was to preserve the area for parking (Ex. 1), defendants' evidence; demonstrated clearly that the Sugarhouse Shopping Center contained an abundance of parking space, much of it added by defendants since their
purchase of the Curtis property. The testimony indicated
that no one, including the plaintiffs, had ever demanded
more parking area (Tr. 71, 74, 75); nor had anyone, including plaintiffs, ever demanded that the specific area
upon which the station is now erected should be used
for parking (Tr. 71). The testimony established that
during defendants' management of its portions of the
Center, there had never been a shortage of parking spaces
nor a need for additional parking areas (Tr. 74). De^
fendants have permitted the use of adjacent property
north of the Center for parking (Tr. 71). In addition,
the evidence showed that in or around 1970 the area
immediately adjacent to the station on the west had
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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been asphalted and paved to provide 26 additional parking spaces (Tr. 70; Ex. 8). This area provides more parking spaces than could the 50-foot strip in question, and,
in addition, as Exhibit 8 shows, this area is much closer
to the main shopping area of the Center and the shops
owned by plaintiffs than the disputed property.
On the other hand, the evidence showed that the
damage to defendants from an injunction will be very
great indeed. American Oil indicated that the injunction
would ruin the commercial value of the station because
access to 13th East Street would be cut off (R. 77-79).
This would render American Oil's investment of some
$92,000 valueless (R. 77-79) and would deprive the consuming public of a conveniently located filling station
(Tr. 79, 94). In fact, there was testimony that the service station had probably increased the value of the entire Center by drawing additional customers, thus benefitting both plaintiffs and defendants (Tr. 95).
The lower court misapplied the law to these facts.
Equity does not grant injunctions when defendant's resulting damage outweighs any benefit to the plaintiff.
The rule, ofter referred to as the "balance of cxmvenience"
or "balance of injury" test, has always been the law of
Utah,
In McGregor v. Silver King Mining Company, 14
Utah 47, 45 P. 1091 (1896),4 the trial court granted
4

Compare also the factually related case of Crescent Mining
Co. v. Silver King Mining Co., 14 Utah 57, 45 P. 1093 (1896).
This later case was finally settled on a second appeal to this
Court, reported at 17 Utah 444, 54 P. 244 (1898).
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plaintiff, an owner of certain mining claims, a temporary
restraining order prohibiting the defendant mining company from entering upon these claims to dig a trench
and lay a pipeline. Plaintiff claimed that the planned
pipeline was a trespass which in time would become an
easement. Upon defendant's interlocutory appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed, setting aside the injunction.
In doing so, the Court quoted the following language from
Bassett v. Manufacturing Co., 47 N. H. 437, with approval:
"The power to grant injunctions to prevent injustice has always been regarded as peculiar and extraordinary. . . . It is not enough
that an injury merely nominal or theoretical is
apprehended, even although an action at law
might be maintained for it; but, to justify the
interposition of the summary power, there must
be cause to fear substantial and serious damage, for which courts of law could furnish no
adequate remedy. . . . If the granting of an
injunction would necessarily cause great loss to
the defendant, — a loss altogether disproportionate to the injury sustained by the plaintiff, — that fact should be considered, in determining whether the application should be
granted, and in some cases it would justly have
great weight. I t has often been supposed that
when the right has been established at law the
plaintiff would be entitled to an injunction as
a matter of course; and this misapprehension
has arisen, probably, from the fact that, in a
large number of cases, injunctions have been
refused upon the express ground that the title
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the plaintiff had not been established at
law, leaving room for inference that if it had
been so established the injunction would have
been issued. This, however, is clearly the doctrine of courts of equity; for they will not
ordinarily exercise this summary and extraordinary power when substantial justice can be
done by courts of law" (45 P . 1093) (Emphasis added).
Lewis v. Pingree National Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 P.
558 (1915), also elucidates the balance of injury test.
The plaintiff, a jewelry merchant, sought damages and
injunctive relief because certain portions of defendant's
bank building projected onto and encroached upon a public sidewalk, thereby obstructing the view of his establishment by passersby and depriving him of potential
customecrs. Plaintiff claimed that the encroachment was
a public nuisance. The trial court awarded plaintiff both
money damages and an injunction requiring defendant
to remove the offending encroachment. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the injunctive relief was
improper:
"In addition to the foregoing, [the Court
found that the injunction was improper because of plaintiff's laches] there are also a few
other features in this case which operate in
favor of the defendant. In view of all the facts
and circumstances, what by Mr. Pomeroy (5
Pom. Eq. Jur. § 508) is called "the balance
of injury" in cases of encroachment is certainly in favor of the defendant, in so far as that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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principle refers to the removal of the front
of the bank building. Here we have a case
where the street is of the generous width of
132 feet from lot line to lot line, 20 feet of
which on either side is devoted to a concrete
sidewalk for pedestrians. The public, therefore, in the nature of things, cannot be inconvienced to any great extent by an obstructed passageway. Then, again, it is clearly shown
that the construction of the front of the building is such that, if the pillars and reinforced
concrete pilasters or columns, which also perform the function of buttresses, are removed,
it will weaken the whole front of the building,
and thus leave it in a weakened condition. . . .
Further, the evidence is to the effect that the
front of the building as now constructed is an
ornament to any city, and to now tear down
and remodel it will entail an expenditure of at
least $15,000, and, as we have seen, the architect
says that even then the building will not answer
the purposes for which it was planned and designed. Upon the other hand, while plaintiff's
building is at least to some extent affected, and
its use for business purposes is deprectiated
in value, yet the depreciation can as readily be
ascertained and compensated as that could be
done if the building were affected and depreciated in value from some other obstruction.
In other words, plaintiff's injury and damages
can be adjusted, and he can be compensated
without inflicting any unnecessary hardship
upon the defendant. May this be done under
the law, in view of the facts and circumstances ?
"We think that it may not only be done,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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but that under the peculiar facts and circumstances it is the only way out, without inflicting an unnecessary hardship upon some one."
(151 P . at 563) (Emphasis added).
The Court restricted the plaintiff to his remedy at
law — damages from the encroachment — because of
the undue hardship on defendant, the economic waste,
and the loss to the community that would result if portions of the building were destroyed by enforcement of
the injunction. In the present case, not only is there
a showing of hardship upon defendants more extreme
than in the Pingree case, there are no damages at all to
plaintiffs against which the court could weigh defendants'
economic loss and the waste of destroying the improvements.
Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First National Building
Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099 (1936), involved a rather
complicated set of facts. Defendant replaced its old
building, which had a common partition wall with plaintiff's building, with a new 13-story structure. Plaintiff
alleged that both a subsurface shaft sunk as a foundation for the new building and certain parts of its facade
encroached on his property and that the new building
caused settling and other damages. Plaintiff sought damages and an injunction requiring defendant to remove
the alleged encroachments. The trial court, giving partial
relief to plaintiff, apparently satisfied neither party. On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed with instructions
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for a new trial. In the course of its opinion, the Court
stated:

•

"Was the plaintiff entitled to a mandatory
injunction as to subsurface encroachment?
These encroachments as found by the court did
no harm. They were completely out of plaintiff's way and could not possibly interef ere with
the enjoyment of its property unless deeper
excavation was necessary. . . . We do not mean
to hold that in certain cases a party might not
be compelled to remove subsurface encroachments into the land of another, where they were
knowingly made without regard to the other's
rights and purely for the benefit of the party
encroaching, and where it could be shown that
they were a detriment to the use of the other's
land and there was no laches or delay in asking
for the remedy. Every case must stand on its
own facts. . . . I n this case, however, there is
no curtailment to the use of plaintiff's premises. The mats and walls were not in officious,
aggressive or ruthless disregard of plaintiff's
rights, but necessary for defendant's structure
and removable when plaintiff desires to excavate. . . . The cost of removing them would be
tremendous as compared to the almost negligible benefit such removal would be to plaintiff. The court was correct in denying the application for the injunction to remove these encroachments.. . ." (57 P.2d at 1125) (Emphasis added).

The Court applied the same balance of injury test
to the above-surface intrusions:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
"Even those jurisdictions which most
severely apply the doctrine that plaintiff had
the right to repel what would amount to a condemnation if a mandatory injunction were not
issued, recognize the principle that there may
be circumstances which in equity would be persuasive of the withholding of the injunction...
In the case of Crosby v. Blomerth . . . and
Mayer v. Flynn, 46 Utah 598,150 P . 962, the
cost of removing the intrusions was very small
compared to the cost involved in removing defendant's structure in this case, and in those
cases if the structure remained it would have
been an actual nuisance and an inconvenience
to the plaintiff. . . . In our own case of Lewis
v. Pingree Nat. Bank, supra, this court recognized the "balance of injury" theory as designated by Pomeroy (5 Pomeroy Eq. J r . § 508).
True, in that case the court held that the
plaintiff might have sooner brought the action,
the encroachment being apparent from the beginning of erection of the bank front. But it
rests primarily on the balance of injury theory;
that where the cost of removal would be disproportionate and oppressive compared to the
benefits derived from it by plaintiff and where
plaintiff can be compensated, the court will not
compel the removal/' (57 P.2d at 1127) (Emphasis added). 5
s

The Mary Jane Stevens case cited with approval Mayer v.
Flynn, 46 Utah 598, 150 P. 962 (1915). There the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant, mistaking the location of his property boundaries, had erected a house that encroached upon
plaintiff's property. The lower court granted judgment for plaintiff compelling defendant to remove the offending structures
[footnote cont'd on next page]
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In each of the above cited cases, the plaintiff complained of an actual invasion of his property, either a
trespass or encroachment. No invasion is present in this
case. The restrictive covenant in fact burdens defendants' premises. In each of the cases the plaintiffs could
show at least some actual damage or physical harm.
This element is also absent in this case. Plaintiffs offered
no proof of damages for the simple reason that the station
is, if anything, a benefit to the Center. The balance of
injury test is even more persuasive here than in those
earlier cases, each of which denied the plaintiff injunctive relief.
and also awarding plaintiff $1.00 in damages. The Supreme
Court affirmed the damage award but reversed with respect to
the mandatory injunction:
"It is not true that where, as in this case, boundary
lines of coterminous owners overlap, and where there has
been a dispute and uncertainty respecting the actual location of such lines, the law requires that either the lines as
described in the deed of one of the parties or that those
described in the deed of the other shall be followed. And
what is not required by the law in that regard certainly
is not required in equity. In a case like this, where no permanent, in fact no, injury can result to the complaining party
by granting him what he is entitled to according to his
possessory rights, and injustice would result if more were
given, the doubt, if any, may well be resolved in favor of
the party on whom unnecessary injury would be inflicted
by compelling him to undo what in good faith and under
a claim of right he did, although he is some slight degree
exceeded the legal limits of his rights. The rules of both
law and equity, under such circumstances, can be vindicated
and justice reflected by compelling the party to undo that,
and that only, which equity and good conscience requires."
(150 P. at 966).
The court then ruled that the defendant should simply be required to cut off and remove the portion of the eves of his roof
which extended out over the roof of the plaintiff's house.
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The balance of injury test is of course a general rule
of equity. See 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, §§57-60
(1969); Annot. 28 A. L. R. 2d 679, 690 (1953) .6 Cf.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. u. Minnette, 246 P. 2d 1025
(Gal. App. 1952); Family Record Plan v. Mitchell, 342
P. 2d 10 (Cal. App. 1959). It applies as well to suits for
specific performance of contracts. As stated in Trustees
of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N. Y. 311 (1882):
" I t certainly is not the doctrine of courts
of equity, to enforce, by its peculiar mandate,
every contract, in all cases, even where specific execution is found to be its legal intention
and effect. I t gives or withholds such decree
according to its discretion, in view of the circumstances of the case. . . . And so though the
contract was fair and just when made, the interference of the court should be denied, if subsequent events have made performance by the
defendant so onerous, that its enforcement
would impose great hardship upon him and
impart little or no benefit to plaintiff." (87
N.Y. at 316-17).
In illustration 3 to Section 359 of the Restatement
of Contracts, the following instructive example is given
concerning the propriety of ordering specific performance
to enforce the terms of a contract:
6

This annotation classifies Utah as being one of the jurisdictions following the "balance of injury" rule.
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l;

"A sells to B a lot with a building thereon,
retaining adjacent land, B contracting not to
make any addition or external alteration without A's written consent. In breach of this contract, B opens a frosted window in the wall of
the building to give necessary light for the first
floor flat. A sues for a mandatory injunction
to compel the closing of the window and for
damages. The breach has caused A no substantial harm. I t is within the discretion of the
court to declare that B has committed a breach,
to award a small sum as damages, and to deny
an injunction conditionally on B's undertaking
never to claim any easement and to keep the
window frosted." (A.L.I., Restatement of
Contracts, § 359 at 641-642 (1932)).

An instructive example of the denial of injunctive
relief in a contract case is Melrose v. Low, 80 Utah 356,
15 P. 2d 31.9 (1932). The plaintiff, a physician, had
entered a contract with defendant whereby the defendant
agreed to pay $5,000 in liquidated damages if, during the
term of the contract, he set up private medical practice
in Carbon County, Utah. The Court found that there
was no showing of irreparable harm to the plaintiff from
the defendant's breach, and therefore denied injunctive
relief. As the Court stated:
"But equity requires that he show something more than the mere making of the contract and its breach. The writ of injunction,
as all the authorities above cited go to show,
is issued in cases of this kind only to prevent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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great and irreparable injury to the complaining party/' (15 P.2d at 321) (Emphasis added).
It is easy to understand why the trial court was
perhaps misled on the balance of injury and convenience
test. There was simply nothing to balance. Plaintiffs
offered no evidence at all of any damage or harm from
the alleged violation of the restrictive covenant. All the
injury in this case will be borne by defendants from the
enforcement of the trial court's injunction, which, if
sustained, will alleviate no harm done to plaintiffs. The
injunction was improper and judgment should be entered
as a matter of law that plaintiffs are not entitled to the
specific relief requested.
B. The Granting of Injunctive Relief Should
Have Been Barred Because of Plaintiffs'' Laches.
"Equity aids the vigilant." Injunctive relief is not
available to those who sleep upon their rights to the
prejudice of the other parities against whom equitable
relief is asked. 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions §61 (1969).
The evidence before the trial court can be interpreted
in two ways. However — and this is the important point
— in either interpretation the trial court should have
found plaintiffs guilty of laches.
American Oil began construction of the station in
December of 1969. The company placed a sign on the
premises announcing to the traveling public that a new
station would be built there. Construction took someDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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what longer than normal because land fill had to be added
to the north end of the premises (Tr. 93).
The record reveals no protest or objection by plaintiffs during construction Mr. Nick Papanikolas testified
that, although he regukrly traveled along 13th East
(Tr. I l l , 112), he saw neither the sign nor the construction of the station until August of 1970 when he suddenly noticed construction on the premises (Tr. 107, 111,
112). Not only did the sign and the ensuing construction escape Mr. Papanikolas' notice, the new station was
also not noticed by the Papanikolas' manager at the shopping center (Tr. 111). The trial court should not have
accepted this unpersuasive testimony and should indeed
have held that plaintiffs knew or should have known
before August of 1970 that the station was being built.7
(See Findings of Fact 15, R. 328-329.)
Even if plaintiffs' testimony is believed, the subsequent delays cannot be explained and ladies should apply. Plaintiffs' attorneys sent their first letter of complaint (Ex. 5) on August 13, 1970. The attorneys for
the partnership replied shortly thereafter that they felt
there was no violation (Ex. 6). On September 1, 1970,
plaintiffs' attorney again wrote to defendant setting
forth additional reasons why they felt there had been
a breach. After these contacts, plaintiffs did nothing
7
Since plaintiffs requested injunctive relief, this is an equity
case, and this Court has power to review the facts and the law.
Utah Constitution, Art. VII, § 9; Metropolitan Investment Co.
v. Sine; 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d 980 (1962).
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until suit was filed in March of 1972, more than 18
months after the station was completed. Plaintiffs were
aware all along that defendants felt there was no breach,
and, further, that defendants were in no position to comply with plaintiffs' request that certain improvements
on the station premises be removed. None of the apparently inconclusive discussions about sale at any time
suggested an agreement that defendants would comply
with any of plaintiffs' requests as set forth in the August
and September 1970 letters. So far as the record reveals,
such compliance was not even discussed.8
In Lewis v. Pingree National Bank, supra, the court
found that the plaintiff, though he attempted to deny
the fact, knew before the erection of the building that
the defendant proposed to project the front of the bank
building into the street. The court found that his delay
in pursuing his remedy was, in addition to the balance
of injury consideration discussed above, enough to preclude granting equitable relief:
". . . we are also satisfied that he did not
act with a degree of promptness and diligence
which, without injury or even inconvenience
to himself, he might have done. He could easily
have brought the matter to the attention of the
8

The delay also goes to the question of harm. If the station
in any way threatened or caused harm to plaintiffs, why did
they wait so long to bring suit? Indeed, the trial court could
easily have found that plaintiffs' actions constituted a knowing
waiver of plaintiffs' rights in the agreement. Cf. Proenix Ins.
Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 P.2d 308 (1936); American Savings & Loan v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 445 P.2d 1 (1968).
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court of equity in time to prevent the construetion of the superstructure of the front of the
building, or at any rate before any considerable
part thereof was constructed." (151 P . at 563)
(Emphasis added).

In Mary Jane Stevens, supra, laches was also an
issue. The court seemed to hold that for those encroachments about which plaintiff had knowledge, laches would
be a bar to injunctive rexlief:

-

"It [plaintiff] was not required to object,
and if it knew that something was going to
be harmful to its property, failure to speak
would not be a tacit consent to that harm, but
would work a denial of the remedy of injunction"9 (57 Y.2d at 1123) (Emphasis added).

There are numerous cases denying injunctive relief
for the enforcement of restrictive covenants because of
the plaintiff's laches. Annot., 12 A. L. R. 2d 394 (1950).
9
The court did however say that as to those encroachments
of which plaintiff had no knowledge there could be no laches:
"A more difficult situation is presented by the intrusions above the ground—the cornice, lintels, and irregularities in the south wall. We find no laches, delay, or estoppel.
Plaintiff warned defendant by letter of April 30, 1926, when
defendant was pouring cement for the 8-inch wall that the
latter was encroaching on its property. While as to those
encroachments it did delay in suing for an injunction, as
to the encroachments of cornice, walls, or lintels, that could
not be discovered until the walls were up." (57 P.2d at 1125).
It should be noted that even in this context the court would
preclude injunctive relief for those encroachments of which the
plaintiff did have knowledge.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
In Loud v. Pendergast, 92 N. E. 40 (Mass. 1910), the
plaintiff brought suit about four months after work had
begun on a house being built in violation of certain setback restrictions. The house was virtually finished and
the violation did not cause plaintiff any pecuniary loss.
Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief was denied on the
ground of laches. In Smith v. Spencer, 87 A. 158 (N. J.
Eq. 1913), the plaintiffs became aware of certain violations of setback restrictions in August of 1911. In October of that year, plaintiffs' counsel wrote a letter complaining about the alleged violation. When no satisfactory response was received, the plaintiffs filed suit in
December of 1911, at which time the alleged violative
building was half completed. The court held that the
plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief was barred by laches.
In McRae v. Lois Grunow Memorial Clinic, 14 P. 2d
478 (Ariz. 1932), the complaint was filed about two weeks
after excavation began upon the foundation of a proposed dental clinic and laboratory. No temporary restraining order was sought and by the time the matter
came on for trial, the defendants' building was virtually
complete. Injunctive relief was denied on the ground
of laches. In Jones v. Smith, 241 F. Supp. 913 (D. V. I.
1965), the plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief was similarly held barred by laches. The plaintiffs claimed violations of restrictive covenants because of defendant's
construction of a duplex. The plaintiffs, so the court
found, had constructive notice of the defendant's claim
for a zoning exception. And before the matter came on
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for trial, the defendant spent over $50,000 towards consitruction of the proposed duplex.
As stated in Reams v. Vrooman-Fehn Printing Co.,
140 F. 2d 237 (6th Cir. 1944):
"It is well settled that 'equity aids the vigilant.' Injunctive relief is reserved for those who
manifest reasonable diligence in asserting their
rights to equitable protection. Such relief will
be denied to the slothful where the power of the
court, if exercised, places another in a position
from which he will be unable to extricate himself without great injury or damages." (140
F . 2 d a t 242).
Plaintiffs did nothing to stop the construction of the
station; and then after demanding compliance with the
claimed restrictive covenant, waited 18 months to bring
suit In the meanwhile, American Oil built the station
and began serving the public. Plaintiffs' delay was never
explained at trial and is, in any event, in no way attributable to the actions of defendants. The lower court
should have ruled that plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief was barred by ladies.
C. The Restrictive Covenant Was Unreasonable, Without Valid Practical Purpose, and
Therefore Unenforceable.
Restrictive covenants are enforceable only so long
as they are reasonable and their enforcement relates to
the purposes for which the covenant was created. 20 Am.
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Jur. 2d, Covenants §182 (1965). In Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P. 2d 940 (1962),
the plaintiffs, owners of certain property on North Temple Street in Salt Lake City, brought a quiet title action,
essentially seeking relief from a restrictive covenant prohibiting the erection of a motel on plaintiffs' premises.
Plaintiffs claimed that significant change in the neighborhood had rendered the covenant unreasonable and unenforceable. The court held the covenant enforceable
because at the time of the execution of the deed containing the covenant, motel construction in the neighborhood
was contemplated and there was increased business activity in the area, both facts making the covenant valuable to the grantors. The court did, however, state with
explicit clarity:
"The second point in contention on this
appeal is the finding of the trial court that the
restriction was not of benefit to the defendants
but only served as a detriment to the plaintiff
and therefore should not be enforced. The parties are in agreement that the restriction should
be ignored if it confers no benefit on the defendants, thereby rendering the restrictive covenant useless but we disagree as to its purpose
and effect. We agree that there is no reason for
continuing the restriction unless there is a benefit to be realized by the defendants. Restrictive
covenants will not be enforced where enforcement is no longer of general usefulness, nor .
capable of serving purpose for which restriction
was imposed, or reason of restriction has
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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r

ceased." (376 P.2d at 944)
omitted, emphasis added).

(Footnotes

The covenant upon which plaintiffs rely provides
that the restrictive areas were to be used for:
"Parking areas for motor vehicles to be
used in common by the parties hereto and the
tenants of their respective land described above
. . . and for the accommodation of customers
of such tenants and the parties hereto, while
transacting business with said parties or shopping in the premises of the tenants of the last
mentioned parcels of land." (Ex. 1).
Paragraph 2 of the agreement clearly provides the
parties will supply additional parking areas as needed:
"Neither party hereto will build or permit to be built any building or structure on any
of their respective land described as parcels A,
B, and C of Recitals I and I I of this Agreement, if such building or structure would result in lowering the said ratio of said parking areas to said floor areas unless the parties
shall ajointly require the additional parking
areas." (Ex., 1).
Thus, the restrictive agreement provides that its
purpose is to insure that there be adequate parking to
meet the needs of the shopping center. The evidence at
trial was clear that such needs are more than adequately
being met.
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The station, so the record reveals, is situated on the
east end of the Center, far from the main buildings and
parking areas (Ex. 8). The record reveals no demand
by any tenant, by the plaintiffs, or by anyone else that
the leased premises be used for additional parking (Tr.
75). As pointed out, the area immediately to the west
of the sitation was asphalted in about 1970 to provide
26 parking spaces not available at the time of the execution of Exhibit 1 (Tr. 70; Ex. 8). Perhaps even more
significantly, the property owned by the Papanikolas
Bros, directly west of this recently provided parking space
has never been asphalted or improved for parking (Tr.
72; Ex. 8). If there were a need for additional parking
in the Center, the question is obvious: Why are not
plaintiffs improving and using this area for that purpose?
The evidence revealed that the 699 spaces currently
provided in the Center are ample (Tr. 71). There has
never been a time when the demands upon the Center
exceeded the available parking space (Tr. 74). In addition, as testified at trial, defendants have supplied from
property adjacent to the north of the Center some additional 45 parking spaces to be used by the tenants and
patrons of the Center (Tr. 71). The evidence thus shows
that, as a matter of law, the enforcement of the claimed
covenant with respect to the 50-foot strip on the east
end of the Center is unreasonable, because such enforcement does nothing to benefit plaintiffs, but produces
great injury to defendants on the basis of a covenant
the purposes of which are clearly being fulfilled.
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D. The March 1954 Agreement Is Ambiguous,
the Evidence Reveals That Plaintiffs Tacitly
Recognize Such Ambiguity, and Such an Agreement Should Therefore Not Be Specifically and
Strictly Enforced by Injunctive Relief against
Defendants.
Restrictive covenants restrict the free use and alienation of property and are, therefore, not favored in the
law. 7 Thompson on Real Property, §3567 (Perm. Ed.
1940); Sine v. Western Travel, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 61, 426
P. 2d 9 (1967); Cf. Wade v. Dorius, 52 Utah 310, 173
P. 564 (1918); Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 14 Utah 2d 366,
384 P. 2d 591 (1963).
As pointed out, the alleged restrictive covenant contains two provisions. It provides that the areas designated are "to be used in common by the parties hereto
and the tenants of their respective land . . . for the accommodation of such tenants and the parties hereto,
while transacting business with said parties or shopping
in the premises of the tenants of the last mentioned
parcels of land" (Ex. 1). The erection of the service
station is perfectly consistent with this language. Plaintiffs seem to admit the validity of this position. The
original August 13 letter of plaintiffs' attorneys to Mr.
Clark and Mr. Collier claimed that the American Oil
station violated agreements of June 8, 1953, and July
14, 1965 (Ex. 5). In response thereto, defendants' attorneys upon review of the March 24, 1954, agreement
stated:
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"Among other thing, that agreement provided that the 50-feet abutting 13th East is to
be used
'for the accommodation of customers
of such tenants . . . while transacting
business with said parties or shopping in
the premises of the tenants . . . ' " (Ex. 6).
Plaintiffs' response to the August 25 letter is interesting. Rather than deny defendants' position, the letter asserts that the March 24, 1954, agreement was modified and presumably clarified by agreements of April 21,
1958, and July 14, 1965. Indeed, the letter claimed that
it is the July 14, 1965, agreement prohibiting building
on the premises that is controlling. Plaintiffs, obviously
recognizing the inherent ambiguities in the original agreement, sought to assert the unrecorded agreements of
which defendants hiad no knowledge as a basis for this
claimed violation of a restrictive covenant. (See Affidavits of Spence Clark and Frederick S. Prince, Jr.; R.
284-288; 61-67).
In fact, until the day of trial plaintiffs' legal theory
depended on the validity of the 1965 agreement. The
original complaint, alleging only one cause of action, was
based on this later agreement (R. 2-5* 9). The amended
complaint, though adding additional claims under other
agreements, was also based in part on the 1965 document
(R. 69-86). Plaintiffs no doubt chose to rely originally
on the 1965 agreement because of that document's restriction on building on the east 50 feet adjacent to 13th
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

East. In so doing, plaintiffs were apparently concerned
about the ambiguity and difficulty of enforcing the original 1954 recorded agreement. For reasons of their own,10
plaintiffs chose ait trial to rely only on the original recorded agreement. The effeot of this practical choice,
because of the ruling of the court permitting plaintiffs
to do so, was to deprive defendants of their opportunity
to show the ambiguity in the agreement. Defendants
should have had the opportunity to do no more than
plaintiffs were doing in their own correspendence. In
any event, plaintiffs cannot have it both ways. They
cannot maintain in correspondence that it is the subsequent agreements which clarify the original ambiguities and detemiine the extent of the defendants'
rights, and then come into court and claim, on the basis
of the original agreement, that there has been a violation of the restrictive covenant.
POINT II.
THE T R I A L C O U R T SHOULD HAVE
GRANTED DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT FOR
FAILURE TO JOIN AN INDISPENSABLE
PARTY.
At trial, American Oil's counsel represented to the
court that Americal Qil Company had subleased the
10

Plaintiffs probably made this choice because it was clear
that none of the defendants had any notice of the subsequent
agreements.
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premises to one Peter R. Murdock (Tr. 4). Apparently
this fetct was discovered by American Oil's attorneys only
the Friday before the trial which began on a Monday.
Mr. Murdock was not notified of the trial nor of any of
the previous proceedings in the case (Tr. 5).
An indispensable party is one whose presence is
needed for a full and complete adjudication of the controversy. Rule 19(a), U. R. C. P.; 3A Moore's Federal
Practice, H19.01-l[2]; Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130,
15 L. Ed. 447 (1855); Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Co.,
94 Utah 134, 76 P. 2d 234 (1938); Cf. Stone v. Salt Lake
City, 11 Utah 2d 796, 356 P. 2d 631 (1960); Baten v.
Nom P. Fletcher Mineral Co., 198 F. 2d 629 (5th Cir.
1952).
Mr. Murdock would not be an indispensable party
in an action for money damages for breach of contract.
If, however, his lease agreement with American Oil gives
him control and possession of the premises, his presence
in these proceedings is essential. The court's judgment
is directed to the defendant American Oil Company to
remove all "buildings, structures, signs, posts,, paving,
landscaping or other construction" from the designated
areas (R. 333-35).lx If American Oil does not, however,
have possessory control of the premises, compliance with
the judgment may force it to violate its sublease agreement with Mr. Murdock.
"This provision of the judgment is particularly difficult
to understand. If the covenants were to provide areas for parking, why should paving, the prime essential of good parking
areas, be removed?
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Murdock has another reason to complain. The order,
assuming arguendo that American Oil is entitled to enter
the premises to comply, in effect puts Murdock out of
business, takes away his livelihood, and threatens him
with possible irreparable harm, all with no opportunity
to be heard and to present his case. To say that he
has a potential action against American Oil for damages
is small consolation for one left only with the prospect
of possibly protracted litigation. Due process and the
law of indispensable painties demands that the sublessee
be heard before the allegedly offending appurtenances
can be removed.
The motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party may be made at any time. 3A Moore's
Federal Practice, 1U9.19. In Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch
Co., supra, the court quoted with approval the following
language from the Illinois case of Gaumer v. Snedeker,
330 111. 511, 162 N. E. 137 (1928):
"Whenever a party has been omitted
whose presence is so indispensable to a decision
of the case upon its merits that a final decree
cannot be made without materially affecting
his interests, the court should not proceed to a
decision of the case upon the merits. The objection may be made by a party at the hearing or
on appeal or error, and the court will upon its
own motion take notice of the omission and require the omitted party to be made a party
to the litigation even though no objection is
made by any party litigant." (76 P.2d at 240).
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CONCLUSION
The balance of equities in this case clearly preponderates in favor of defendants. To force compliance with
the restrictive covenant is to impose great loss on defendants, to deprive the public of a conveniently located
service station, to disregard the rights of an indispensable
party, all in the face of no harm or damage to plaintiffs.
In fact, plaintiffs' own position with respect to the
claimed covenant implicitly admits that the service station is consistent with the purposes of the March 24,
1954, agreement, or at least that that agreement is so
ambiguous that enforcement of the restrictive covenant
is improper as a matter of law. The judgment of the
trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
PRINCE, YEATES, WARD,
MILLER & GELDZAHLER
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